We study the effect of staggered boards (SBs) on managers' behavior and on long-run firm value using a natural experiment: a 1990 law that imposed a SB on all firms incorporated in Massachusetts. We find that the law led to an increase in Tobin's Q, increased investment in capital expenditure and R&D, more patents, less earnings management and higher ROA. These effects are concentrated at innovating firms-those firms that are early-life-cycle or engage in R&D spending-and especially at those facing Wall Street scrutiny. Collectively, the evidence suggests that early-life-cycle firms facing high information asymmetries benefit from staggered boards, in part because managers make more valuable long-term investments and reduce myopic behavior.
Introduction
No corporate-governance topic has been more heavily debated in recent years than the impact of staggered (or "classified") boards (SBs). SBs are considered the most importantand some argue the only meaningful-common defense against hostile takeovers (Daines and Klausner, 2001; Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, 2002b; Klausner, 2013; Catan and Kahan, 2016) .
1 No hostile bidder has ever taken over a firm protected by a staggered board if directors opposed the merger; SBs allow incumbent directors to resist the will of even a majority of shareholders and to delay changes of control for several years. To understand the effects of insulating managers from the market for corporate control, therefore, one must understand the effects of staggered boards. This paper provides such evidence in a quasiexperimental setting by estimating the causal effects of SBs on firm value and managerial behavior, including investment and reporting decisions.
Understanding the effects of staggered boards is important to understanding the effects of managerial entrenchment. A large body of work examines the effect of takeover defenses by exploiting the variation in state-level (e.g., Bertrand, 2004 ), or specific firm-level antitakeover provisions (e.g., such as poison pills, Bhojraj, Sengupta, and Zhang, 2017) , or composite indexes formed using both types of provisions (e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) . However, legal scholars have recently challenged the legal, institutional, and empirical basis of these findings (e.g., Coates IV, 2000; Klausner, 2013; Catan and Kahan, 2016) . For these reasons, our study focuses on staggered boards, the most important variation in firms' exposure to the market for corporate control.
Understanding the effects of staggered boards is especially important in light of investors' growing opposition and the resulting trend of declassification. The Council of Institutional Investors, major institutional investors (e.g., American Funds, BlackRock, CalPERS, Fi-1 delity, TIAA-CREF, and Vanguard), and the two leading proxy advisors (ISS and Glass Lewis) have all adopted voting policies opposing staggered boards. Shareholder activists often press management to abolish the practice of staggered boards, and investors typically vote to eliminate them when given the chance: shareholder proposals to de-stagger boards have won more than 80% of votes cast in recent years. As a result, the number of Standard & Poor 500 (S&P 500) companies with staggered boards has declined by 83%, from 300 in the year 2000 to 50 in 2017.
Opponents argue that staggered boards harm shareholders by insulating directors and managers from the beneficial disciplinary forces of shareholder control-leading to such agency problems as shirking and empire building (a position known as "the entrenchment view") (Manne, 1965) . SBs can also be used by self-interested agents to block acquisition attempts (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1981 ) that would benefit shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980) . A body of empirical research generally supports this view.
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By contrast, supporters of SBs argue that directors (and under their supervision, managers) can make better investment and other decisions when they are protected from shareholder oversight.
3 Directors have superior information about the firm's prospects and may rationally avoid making valuable investments if they can be ousted (or if the firm can be taken over) before the value of those investments becomes apparent to shareholders (Stein, 1988 (Stein, , 1989 . Because a staggered board protects the firm from takeovers in the short run (before the value of some investments is realized), managers protected by a staggered board 2 Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) document a strong and negative association between staggered boards and firm value, measured by Tobin's Q. A number of subsequent papers support this view: staggered boards have been associated with lower market valuation (Guo, Kruse, and Nohel, 2008; Cohen and Wang, 2013) , smaller gains to shareholders in completed takeovers (Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, 2002a; Bebchuk et al., 2002b) , worse acquisition decisions (Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007) , and weaker board monitoring (Faleye, 2007 can focus on creating long-run value and avoid inefficient short-termism when the value of investments is not understood by outsiders. Supporters also argue that SBs improve the firm's bargaining power in the event of a takeover bid; protected by a staggered board, managers can credibly refuse a bid and bargain for more money (DeAngelo and Rice, 1983) .
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The impact of SBs is an empirical question, but the intense academic and public policy debate about staggered boards persists, in our view, because current research suffers from four shortcomings. First, research on staggered boards is almost entirely correlational rather than causal. It is therefore possible that the negative correlation between staggered boards and firm value reflects selection rather than causation. Although recent research has begun to address causation (e.g., Cremers, Litov, and Sepe, 2017; Cohen and Wang, 2013) , the credibility of the causal inference-such as the validity of the parallel-trends assumptionsremain problematic and contested (Catan and Klausner, 2017; Amihud, Schmid, and Davidoff Solomon, 2017a) . Second, prior studies have largely ignored how SBs affect managerial behavior, including investment and reporting decisions. Third, even if SBs are on average harmful, they may be beneficial for some firms and little work has been devoted to understanding possible heterogeneous effects of SBs. Finally, existing work commonly fails to clearly distinguish between SBs and other, less powerful defenses (see more detailed discussion in Section 3 below).
We make four important contributions to the contentious debate on staggered boards and managerial entrenchment. First, we provide strong causal evidence of staggered boards' long-run impact on firm value. Our identification strategy is based on a policy shock in Massachusetts (MA), where a state law adopted in 1990 exogenously imposed a staggered board on MA-incorporated firms. We believe the Massachusetts law offers a natural setting to study the long-term effects of a staggered board and therefore construct a quasi-experiment by comparing the value of treated firms (firms that acquired a staggered board because of the legislation) to the value of similar control firms between 1984 and 1997. Using a difference-indifferences (DID) design, estimates suggest that MA firms forced to adopt staggered boards saw an average increase in Tobin's Q of 14.3% over the next 7 years. These findings are robust: they hold when we extend the analysis to 15 years post-legislation, when we use the new measure of Total Q proposed by Peters and Taylor (2017) , and when we control for various time-varying firm or industry-level effects. They are also robust to the inclusion of lagged Q or firm-fixed effects. Moreover, we provide evidence for the validity of the empirical design, in particular the parallel-trends assumption, on which the average treatment effect is identified. We find no evidence of differential trends in Q prior to 1990 or that our results are driven by differential economic trends among MA firms after 1990.
Second, we contribute to the emerging literature (e.g., Johnson, Karpoff, and Yi, 2015; Bhojraj et al., 2017) that examines the heterogeneous effects of takeover defenses on firm value, and build on the prior work by examining staggered boards in a quasi-experimental setting. Our evidence on Tobin's Q suggests that SBs could be beneficial for early-life-cycle firms that face more severe information asymmetries, because the affected firms in MA are on average small, young, and less profitable. We find out-of-sample validation by examining the widely used and larger database from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).
Estimating the traditional cross-sectional Q regressions from the literature (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang, 2013) , we find that, although the association between Tobin's Q and staggered boards is indeed positive and significant for early-life-cycle firms facing high levels of asymmetry, the association is negative and significant for mature firms.
Third, we provide the first evidence of SBs' impact on managerial behavior, including investment decisions, earnings management, and ultimately firms' operating performance.
Specifically, we find that managers behaved differently when protected from shareholder 4 scrutiny: after the legislation, managers invested more in capital expenditures and R&D, secured more patents, engaged in less earnings management, and their firms improved in profitability.
Finally, we provide an explanation for why and for whom SBs are most likely to add value: SBs allow certain managers-at young and high-asymmetry firms-to focus on longrun value by insulating them from market pressures. In subsample analyses, we find that the effects of staggered boards resulting from the legislation-increased Tobin's Q, investments, patents, and ROA and reduced earnings management-are all concentrated at firms that young or that invest in R&D ("innovating" firms). Moreover, these patterns are especially pronounced at innovating firms that were covered by sell-side analysts and thus particularly subject to Wall Street pressures.
The results documented in this paper suggest that the greater insulation afforded by staggered boards is valuable to an important subset of firms, and are consistent with the empirical observation that a large proportion of IPO firms-which tend to be younger and to face greater information asymmetries-adopt staggered boards. We note, however, that our study is unable to resolve the ongoing debate on the effect of staggered boards at the largest and most mature public firms.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains why staggered boards matter and how they regulate exposure to the market for corporate control. Section 3 examines prior research on staggered boards. Section 4 details the Massachusetts legislation imposing staggered boards on public firms. Section 5 presents our empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Why Staggered Boards Are the Most Important Common Takeover Defense A company's board structure is either unitary (or annually elected) or staggered. Directors of unitary boards all stand for election at each annual shareholder meeting; members of staggered boards, by contrast, belong to separate classes-typically three classes-whose terms are staggered. Because shareholders vote on only one class of directors (one-third of the board) each year, a change in control requires an insurgent group to win a majority of shareholder votes in at least two consecutive annual meetings.
To understand why the staggered board is the most effective commonly-used defense against takeovers, and why it is therefore a focus of debate, one must first understand the nature of the poison pill. Though justifiably famous, the poison pill is a potent device only at firms with staggered boards. Its main effect is to ensure that changes of control occur via elections rather than via the sale of shares (Gilson and Schwartz, 2001) .
A poison pill is created when a board allows certain shareholders to purchase a great deal of newly issued stock very cheaply in the event that anyone buys a block of shares (typically 10-20%) without managers' prior approval. If the pill is triggered, the bidder's ownership stake will be drastically diluted, or even rendered worthless, making an acquisition impossibly expensive for an unapproved buyer; thus, no acquirer has ever intentionally triggered a poison pill. As long as the pill is in place, it is an insurmountable defense against a takeover.
All public firms either have a poison pill in place or can speedily adopt one whenever necessary, even after an unsolicited bid is announced.
6 Thus a hostile bid can succeed only 5 In December 2008, Versata Enterprises triggered Selectica's NOL poison pill. This move was not part of a takeover contest; it was related to a commercial dispute. The Selectica pill was designed to protect a net operating loss asset whose value depended on whether there had been a change of ownership, not to deter hostile bids.
6 See, for example, the famous Unitrin case, in which the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a poison pill adopted after a tender offer was initiated.
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if it can defeat a poison pill. Because a pill can only be canceled by the board of directors, a bidder must either persuade incumbent directors to eliminate it or wage a proxy fight to oust them and elect new directors who will quickly remove it and allow the takeover to proceed.
Note that a new board can also quickly eliminate any other defenses that are subject to the board's discretion, such as control-share, fair-price, business-combination, and supermajority provisions (Daines and Klausner, 2001) . These other discretionary defenses thus impose no marginal cost, given that a bidder must always replace the board to eliminate a poison pill.
In short, because directors can adopt a poison pill at any time, every hostile takeover requires incumbents to be voted out. The pill makes elections critical: a hostile bidder must place an attractive offer on the table and persuade shareholders to replace incumbents with a slate of directors willing to reconsider the offer and pull the pill. A staggered board prolongs such a change in control of the board, and this delay is risky and costly to the bidder, who incurs up-front search and bidding costs. Incumbent managers retain control of the target firm in the interim and may sabotage the bidder's plans by seeking another buyer, selling valued assets, or pursuing incompatible strategies.
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Thus, when it is easier to remove incumbent directors in a proxy fight-that is, when a company has a unitary board-the company and its managers will be more exposed to the market for corporate control. When it is difficult to remove incumbent directors-when the board is staggered-managers will be insulated.
7 Under a unitary board structure, incumbent directors and their defenses can be quickly removed-often within four to six weeks. If the shareholders have the power to vote by written consent, such an election can be held within three to four weeks. Otherwise, bidders must distribute and collect proxies, which takes roughly six weeks. An election can be held at any time during the year if shareholders can either call a special meeting or vote by written consent. If they can do neither, insurgents must await an annual meeting. If a board is staggered, shareholders may not call interim elections or remove incumbent directors except in extreme cases, such as instances of theft, fraud, or gross inefficiency and incompetence (Balotti and Finkelstein, 2008) .
Prior Research on Staggered Boards
Considerable recent research has examined how managerial behavior and firm value are affected by governance devices that protect managers from the market for corporate control (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Cremers et al., 2017; Bebchuk et al., 2013; Atanassov, 2013) . A centerpiece of this research, and a subject of intense ongoing debate, is the value of staggered boards. The literature on staggered boards has developed in parallel to the literature on takeover defenses because they are considered the most important source of variation in firms' exposure to the market for corporate control; thus, any theory about how insulation affects firm value or managerial behavior must be shown through staggered boards.
Much of the empirical work on this topic appears to support the entrenchment view. Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) Faleye (2007) finds that staggered boards are associated with lower CEO pay-performance sensitivity and lower CEO performance-turnover sensitivity. Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008) finds that staggered boards are associated with higher takeover premiums but lower takeover likelihood; consistent with earlier work, it also documents a negative association with firm valuation. Finally, the event studies of Daines (1997) and Cohen and Wang (2013) provide evidence that investors view staggered boards as reducing shareholder value.
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Despite this evidence, debate continues to rage-in part, we believe, due to the limitations 8 The evidence of Daines (1997) , which studies market reactions to the passage of the Massachusetts legislation examined in this paper, suggests that markets were inefficient with respect to the value-implications of staggered boards in 1990. Consistent with this view, Bebchuk et al. (2013) shows that during the 1990s markets learned gradually about the value-implications of insulating governance devices. The event study of Cohen and Wang (2013) relies on two 2010 Delaware court rulings that affect the strength of staggered boards at a subset of Delaware-incorporated firms; their effects are local to a subsample of Delaware firms, which are in general different from non-Delaware firms, e.g., larger in size and with higher Q (Daines, 2001 ).
of existing research evidence. First, nearly all empirical research on staggered boards is correlational and lacks a clean strategy for identifying causal effects. Second, much of this research focuses on the effect of staggered boards on Tobin's Q, and does not examine effects on managerial behavior, which are important for understanding the causal mechanisms of staggered boards. Third, much of this research has focused on average effects on the firm value of the larger and more mature firms that are covered by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), and relatively little is known about the heterogeneous effects of staggered boards. Fourth, studies often lump SBs-which likely matter most-together with takeover defenses that likely do not (see more discussion below).
Recent papers challenging the entrenchment view, for example Ge, Tanlu, and Zhang (2016) and Cremers et al. (2017) who study the consequences of de-staggering, and the subsequent challenge to their work (e.g., Catan and Klausner, 2017; Amihud et al., 2017a) , have further fueled the debate. For example, Catan and Klausner (2017) argues that the Cremers et al. (2017) findings are spurious because of the failure of the parallel-trends identification assumption on which their inferences rely. More generally, both Catan and Klausner (2017) and Amihud et al. (2017a) argue that the self-selection of firms that choose to de-stagger muddies the causal interpretation of empirical patterns associated with these events. This ongoing debate highlights the need for an analysis of SBs in a quasi-experimental setting that could shed light on how SBs affect firm value and managerial behavior, including an examination of the identifying assumptions and causal mechanisms. Our study fills this need. Our findings also contribute evidence on the the heterogeneous effects of staggered boards, suggesting they are valuable for firms that are early in their life cycles and thus face greater information asymmetry.
Empirical evidence on staggered boards is particularly important in the long-standing academic inquiry about the efficacy of insulating managers from the market for corporate control, in light of the recent criticisms of the existing empirical literature. For example, a large body of literature has examined these issues by exploiting state-level anti-takeover statutes (e.g., Garvey and Hanka, 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Giroud and Mueller, 2010; Atanassov, 2013) . However, the findings from this work have been called into question recently: for example, Catan and Kahan (2016) argues that the anti-takeover statutes exploited in this literature are not economically important in the U.S. legal-institutional environment. Others have exploited the variation in specific firm-level defenses, such as poison pills (Malatesta and Walkling, 1988; Ryngaert, 1988; Comment and Schwert, 1995; Bhojraj et al., 2017) .
9 However, Coates IV (2000) and Catan and Kahan (2016) point out the difficulty of interpreting empirical results based on the observed variation in poison pills, given that all public firms are implicitly protected by a "shadow" poison pill. Finally, other scholars have attempted to exploits anti-takeover indexes that sum the number of anti-takeover provisions adopted by the firm (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2015) . This work too has come under question, as scholars (e.g., Klausner, 2013) noted that much of the variation in these indexes is meaningless in event of a takeover. These recent criticisms suggest that, despite many years of empirical investigation in this area, much more work is required to build a solid understanding of the effects of insulating managers. We do so in this paper by exploiting the most important variation in firms' exposure to the market for corporate control-staggered boards.
In short, there is good reason to think that SBs are the only common important takeover defense and source of variation in regulating a firm's exposure to the market for corporate control. And the Massachusetts's legislation imposing a SB on public firms is, in our view, the best setting for studying the effect of this important governance device.
The Massachusetts Legislation
On March 16, 1990, a large British industrial firm, BTR P.L.C., made a hostile tender offer for the shares of Norton Company, a Massachusetts manufacturer of sandpaper, industrial abrasives, and ceramics. The offer was good news for Norton shareholders: BTR's $75 all-cash offer represented a 50% premium over the company's share price one month earlier and was well above its 52-week high of $60. Because Norton was protected by a poison pill, BTR also launched a proxy fight to remove Norton's incumbent directors and install its own nominees, who could then (if they chose) dismantle Norton's defenses and consummate the takeover.
Norton's managers and employees, and Massachusetts legislators, were less enthusiastic.
Norton managers mobilized employees and local politicians with claims that a takeover could prompt layoffs and cuts in R&D spending, or reduce the firm's charitable giving. The opposition even took on a nationalistic flavor. The Boston Globe denounced "a surprise dawn attack on one of the oldest manufacturing concerns in Massachusetts" (Boston Globe, March 17, 1990). The New York Times reported that Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis "compared BTR's tender offer to the British invasion of America during the Revolutionary War, explaining that it was 'another attempt by a foreign power to interfere with our ability to shape our own [destiny]'" (New York Times, May 27, 1990: 11). Other politicians decried this "second British invasion" and joined Dukakis in vowing to protect the "good, solid Massachusetts company" from being "victimized" or "devoured" by the "the foreign acquiror"
(UPI, March 19; Boston Globe, April 9). Norton employees even burned the Union Jack at demonstrations outside local government offices (Reuters, April 12: 46); others sang "God Bless America."
Massachusetts politicians expressed "mounting concern" about foreign takeovers of "critically positioned US companies" (Financial Times, April 20: 40). Because Norton also made ceramic parts used in the aerospace industry, they argued, the firm's independence was important to U.S. national security; they petitioned the federal government, on nationalsecurity grounds, to stop the impending takeover.
Fearing the prospect that shareholders would oust incumbent board members at the upcoming annual meeting, Norton managers sought help from the state legislature. With the aid of the law firm that had invented the poison pill, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
Norton's managers and their allies proposed legislation that would impose a staggered board on all Massachusetts firms. A staggered board would prevent BTR from gaining a majority of the board seats in the next election, and would give managers additional time to seek alternatives. The proposed legislation, MA House Bill 5556, provided that a board, once staggered, could opt out of that structure at its discretion. But this opt-out offered shareholders little leeway. Once protected by a staggered board, directors would have incentives to retain that protection. Moreover, a board's decision to opt out would not be credible because it was easily reversible: a board that voted to opt out of staggering was always free to opt back in later on, even after receiving a hostile bid (as one firm in our sample did).
10 Shareholders were not allowed to vote on a board's initial decision about whether to opt out of the bill's coverage. Moreover, although shareholders could eventually vote to opt out, they were not allowed to do so for two years; even then, they would need a super-majority vote. (We found no firms whose shareholders succeeded at opting out.)
Because the proposed law would change the balance of power between shareholders and managers at MA firms, it was decried by institutional investors as "an unprecedented assault on the most fundamental right of shareholders, the right to elect a board to represent their interests" (UPI, April 17). Some commentators even questioned whether the legislation was constitutional (Bainbridge, 1992) .
In spite of warnings from so-called "New York" investors that they would invest in firms in other states if the law passed (Boston Globe, April 9), it was rushed through committees with remarkable speed. On April 17, in an emergency session attended by only "a handful of representatives," the bill was passed by both the House and the Senate (New York Times, May 27, 1990: 11). Norton managers had thus secured, via lobbying, a takeover defense that shareholders would not have granted.
The next day, in the presence of cheering Norton employees, Governor Dukakis signed the bill and praised the firm's victory in a second "War of Independence" (Reuters, April 19). At the signing ceremony, "Norton chairman John Nelson, who was occasionally close to tears, said he was grateful for the bill because Norton and other state companies will no longer 'be vulnerable to the one-two punch of a simultaneous last-minute tender offer and 5 Empirical Results
Sample Selection and Research Design
To investigate the long-run impact of staggered boards, our main empirical analyses examine the average effect of the legislation on the value of affected firms, i.e., MA-incorporated firms whose boards were staggered due to the state law (treatment firms). To estimate such an effect, we match the affected firms with a set of similar non-MA-incorporated firms without staggered boards (control firms). Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that a firm's decision whether to incorporate in Massachusetts (typically made years earlier)
is unrelated to the effect of a staggered board on firm value and managerial behavior.
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We first identify a broad set of potential treatment firms by hand-collecting MA-incorporated firms with valid observations in the CRSP-Compustat Merged (CCM) database around the date of the legislation. Specifically, we look for firms with annual filings both before and after the legislation, and exclude firms that had already signed merger agreements or REITs due to their unique governance structure. We require proxies to be available for 1989 or 1990, obtained from either Lexis Nexis or Compact Disclosure, to determine whether a given firm had a staggered board prior to the legislation. This initial hand collection resulted in a potential treatment sample of 67 MA-incorporated firms that did not have staggered boards prior to April 1990. From this sample, we eliminate 5 firms that had reincorporated by 1997
(the end of our sample period) or for which the most recent incorporation information is unavailable; we also eliminate one firm with missing values for total assets. 12 Finally, we also eliminate 4 firms that had dual-class shares, resulting in a final sample of 57 treatment firms, for which we obtain from CCM all available financial data for the period 19841997.
We manually verify that the firms were affected by the legislation, and find no firms in our sample whose shareholders opted out of the legislation.
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We follow similar steps to identify a set of potential non-MA-incorporated non-staggered control firms: we require them to have valid observations in CCM around the date of legislation, to have proxies available for 1989 or 1990, and to have a valid state of incorporation.
We filter out firms with staggered boards in 1990 and firms incorporated in Delaware, whose unique legal environment might prompt a different selection of firms to incorporate there.
14 From this pool we construct a matched control sample by matching, for each treatment firm, the two firms within a given 2-digit Global Industry Classification (GICS2) industry that are closest (in Mahalanobis distance) in terms of the following firm characteristics: pre-1990 mean total assets, pre-1990 mean book-to-market ratio, and firm age as of 1990. 15 The resulting control sample consists of 114 non-MA-incorporated non-staggered firms, for which 12 Applying these filters to the MA non-treated firms (i.e., those with staggered boards) results in a final sample of 32. Our results are robust to the inclusion of re-incorporation firms. 13 We do find firms whose boards opted out of the legislation, but such firms are considered treated because their boards can opt back in at their discretion. As explained in the prior section, MA-incorporated firms whose shareholders did not opt out of the legislation are either explicitly or implicitly protected by a staggered board, much like the implicit protection afforded by a poison pill, irrespective of whether a pill is explicitly in place. Indeed, we found at least one firm (TCC) whose board originally opted out of staggering, but later opted back in when faced with a takeover attempt.
14 In general, firms incorporate either in their home state or in Delaware. Firms that select Delaware tend to be significantly larger and more likely to engage in M&A transactions (Daines, 2001) .
15 Our main findings are qualitatively similar when matched to the closest GICS2 peer.
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all available financial data are obtained from CCM for the years 1984 to 1997. 
Summary Statistics
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Relative to the IRRC sample of firms in 1990, the average treated firm in our sample is small and young, faces greater information asymmetry, and is less profitable in terms of ROA. Column 5 reports the percentile ranks of the treated-firm means relative to the population of firms included in the IRRC, the set of firms on which much prior work on staggered boards and governance has been based (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Masulis et al., 2007; Bebchuk et al., 2009 Bebchuk et al., , 2013 . The average firm has total assets approximately equivalent to the 19 th percentile of the IRRC sample, faces information asymmetry greater than 99.8% of the IRRC sample, and is older than only 22.6% of the IRRC firms. Thus the treatment effects estimated in this study pertain to firms earlier in their life cycles and facing greater information asymmetry than the larger and more mature 16 We use the Amihud illiquidity ratio as a measure of information asymmetry. This measure is the absolute value of the daily return-to-volume ratio and is computed over the first three months of 1990 for those firms with at least 2 positive and 2 negative return dates and with at least 10 total valid return observations. 17 In untabulated results, we also find that the control and treated firms' median values for each of these firm characteristics are statistically indistinguishable from each other; again, Tobin's Q is virtually identical at the median (1.32 for treatment firms and 1.28 for their matched control firms).
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firms covered by the IRRC.
The Effect of the Massachusetts Legislation on Tobin's Q
Following prior literature, our first analysis focus on the impact of staggered boards on Tobin's Q (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Cremers et al., 2017) . Moving to multivariate regression analysis, Table 2 reports our baseline estimates of the average treatment effects on the MA-treated firms using difference-in-differences (DID) specifications. Our empirical tests focus on the 14-year period surrounding the 1990 Massachusetts legislation: seven years in the pre-treatment period (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) and seven years in the post-treatment period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) .
18 The dependent variable of interest is log of Tobin's Q (tobin's q). As argued in Amihud, Schmid, and Davidoff Solomon (2017b) , log of Q is desirable because of the strong positive skewness in Tobin's Q. Moreover, this choice facilitates interpretation of our estimated effects in terms of the percent change in Q. Finally, since we are exploiting a state-level legal change, to account for arbitrary time-series correlation within states we cluster standard errors at the state level (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004 ) and also at the year level to account for across-firm correlation.
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Column 1 reports a basic specification from pooled OLS regressions of tobin's q on a treatment indicator (Treat), a post-legislation indicator (Post), and an interaction of the two variables (Treat x Post). We note that neither the Treat nor the Post variable differs significantly from 0 at the 10% level, suggesting that the treated and control firms do not differ significantly from one another in tobin's q during the pre-treatment period, consistent
with Table 1 , and that there is not a significant post-treatment trend in tobin's q among the control firms. This finding implies that any effects we capture in the DID estimator-the coefficient on Treat x Post-must be driven by changes among the MA-treated firms in the post period.
Columns 2, 3, and 4 incrementally include control variables in estimating more robust versions of the baseline DID specification. Column 2 includes linear controls for one-year-lagged firm characteristics, following Catan and Klausner (2017) , to account for the possibility that our matching algorithm does not adequately capture the treatment-control sample differences that could explain the subsequent variation in Q. Our controls include firm age (age) and one-year-lagged values of sales (sales), assets (assets), roa (roa), leverage (leverage), R&D expense scaled by assets (r&d-to-assets), and capital expenditure scaled by assets (capex-toassets). Column 3 incrementally includes time-fixed effects, thus dropping the post-period indicator (Post). Finally, column 4 includes industry-fixed effects.
Most notably, the coefficient on Treat x Post remains similar in magnitude and statistical significance across these specifications; by contrast, the adjusted R 2 s of these specification are increasing from 0.83% in the baseline DID specification of column 1 to 21.31% in the specification of column 4, which includes time-fixed effects, industry-fixed effects, and firmlevel controls. As Oster (2017) suggests, these patterns alleviate potential concerns about 19 Our results are similar when clustered at the firm and year levels.
omitted variable biases in our research design, and lends credence to our natural-experiment setting. 20 The next two subsections address and show in detail the robustness of these main findings to potential additional sources of omitted variables.
Interpreting the coefficient in column 4, our main specification, MA-treated firms, experienced an on-average 14.3% improvement in Tobin's Q due to the imposition of staggered boards. These results suggest that among Massachusetts treated firms-early-life-cycle firms that face considerable information asymmetry-the imposition of staggered boards increased firm value, and could be consistent with the argument that, among such firms, staggered boards allow managers to focus on long-run strategy and investments, whose value may not be clear to outsiders.
Robustness Tests
This section examines the robustness of the main results. We provide empirical assessments of the internal validity of the findings reported above, as well as external validation of the conclusions we draw from the Massachusetts quasi-experiment. Table 3 reports the results of a number of robustness tests by varying the model specification reported in Table 2 , column 4. Column 1 excludes the 1989-1991 time window, allowing for an "adjustment period" around the legal change. The treatment effect remains positive and statistically significant, with the magnitude of the coefficient increasing slightly to 15.76%.
Varying the Model Specification
20 Prior studies have also included as control variables contemporaneous values of return on assets, capital expenditures, and investments in research and development. However, as noted by Catan and Klausner (2017) , such measures are more appropriately regarded as outcome variables; thus lagged values are more appropriate, and are included in our standard specifications. Nevertheless, we confirm in untabulated results that our main results are robust to controlling for the contemporaneous values of these variables.
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Column 2 extends the sample period to include the 20 years from 1984 to 2004. To the extent that our documented effects are correlated with the dot-com bubble, extending the window to 2004 (i.e., after the burst of the bubble) might attenuate the estimated treatment effects of staggered boards. However, compared to the results in Table 2 , column 4, we find that extending our sample period to 2004 yields a treatment effect that remains statistically significant, with the magnitude of the coefficient slightly larger at 14.75%.
We note that this effect in tobin's q does not appear to be driven by differential attrition among treatment and control firms. The attrition rates are similar: by 1997, our sample-end year, 82% of the treated MA firms and 75% of control firms remain. Moreover, in unreported results we consider a zero-investment strategy that goes long an equal-weighted portfolio of MA treatment firms from May 1990 and goes short an equal-weighted portfolio of matched control firms. This strategy takes into account that any delisting returns and firms that drop out of the sample are reinvested in the market, using the CRSP value-weighted index returns. This strategy produces a cumulative return between May 1990 and December 1997 of 320% for the long portfolio and 281% for the short portfolio, netting a 38.67% return.
These findings are consistent with our results in tobin's q and suggest that differential sample attrition is unlikely to drive our findings.
We next turn to the issue of potential confounders. Although our main results include a number of firm-level controls that could drive tobin's q, year-fixed effects (which account for the effects of firm-invariant cross-sectional omitted variables), and industry-fixed effects (which account for the effects of time-invariant industry-level omitted variables), we provide a number of tests to examine the robustness of our results to various additional potential sources of omitted-variables bias.
We begin by examining the possibility that our findings could be attributable to biases arising from measurement errors in Tobin's Q. Peters and Taylor (2017) proposes an alternative measurement of Q that accounts for firms' investments in intangible capital, which 20 are ignored by the standard measurements of Q but called for by the economic theory. We obtain this alternative measure from the Wharton Research Data Services, and estimate our main specification (from Table 2 ), column 4, using total q as the dependent variable. In Table 3 , column 3, we estimate a statistically significant (at the 5% level), positive, and even larger treatment effect: an on-average 42% increase in Total Q. Although it is possible that these magnitudes could be driven by particular measurement peculiarities proposed by Peters and Taylor (2017), our main results do not appear to be driven by differences in intangible capital between MA-treated firms and their matched control firms.
Next, we examine the possibility that other unobserved firm-level variables could confound our main findings. We account for the possibility that time-invariant firm-specific omitted variables could confound our results by using firm-fixed effects. In column 4, we find that the estimated treatment effect remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level even after including firm-fixed effects.
We also examine the possibility that time-varying omitted variables could confound our results. Such confounders are extremely difficult to capture, but we examine their potential effects in several ways. First, we approximate their effects by including a control for the lagged dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2010). Our estimated effects, reported in column 5, remain statistically significant at the 1% level. Second, we examine whether a particular time-varying confounder, industry-level trends, could confound results. Column 6 reports the results from estimating our main specification but includes industry-year-fixed effects; since these fixed effects absorb industry-fixed effects and year-fixed effects, the latter are dropped from the regression. The estimated treatment effect remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that industry-level trends are unlikely to confound our main findings. The next subsection provides further analyses of the possibility that differential trends applicable to both the treated firms and the control firms could confound our findings.
Assessing the Parallel-Trends Assumption
Perhaps the most important potential confounder is the possibility that, absent treatment, the treated firms in MA and their matched control firms would have followed different trends. The assumption of parallel trends is central to the identification of the average treatment effect (on the treated firms); its violation could lead to misleading inferences. For example, Catan and Klausner (2017) identify violation of this crucial assumption as the main driver of the findings of Cremers et al. (2017) about the effect of staggered boards.
The parallel-trends assumption cannot be fully tested because counterfactual outcomes after the policy change are unobservable, but we will examine this issue in two ways. Although the treatment and control firms were similar before the legislation, in terms of both the means in background characteristics and the trends in Q, it is still possible that treatment firms became more valuable because of favorable economic conditions for MA 22 firms and not because staggered boards were imposed. Thus, the second way we address the possibility of differential trends-in particular, the possibility that MA firms could have experienced differential trends in tobin's q after 1990-is to utilize a holdout sample of MA firms that were not affected by the MA law (i.e., MA firms that already had staggered boards before the 1990 legislation or that had dual-class shares). We perform a placebo test using these MA unaffected firms and their two most closely matched control firms (i.e., non-MA firms staggered in 1990 from the same GICS2 industry as the treatment firm and closest to it in terms of pre-treatment mean total assets, pre-treatment mean book-to-market ratio, and firm age in 1990). If the unaffected MA firms also became more valuable over time relative to their matched controls, this would suggest that the main effects we document above arise from economic conditions (i.e., differential economic trends) for MA firms that our matching algorithm fails to account for, rather than from the MA legislation. Table 4 , columns 3 and 4, report the results of our tests following the specifications in Table 2 , columns 3 and 4. The DID coefficients of -0.0376 and -0.0362 are not only statistically insignificant; they are also economically insignificant relative to the Table 2 estimates of 0.1427 and 0.1430. These results suggest that the main findings of Table 2 are driven by the imposition of staggered boards and not by differential economic trends.
As an additional check, we also estimated our baseline specifications in Table 2 using a sample that matches the affected MA firms to the two most closely matched control firms incorporated in California. This alternative matching algorithm addresses the possibility that the economic expansion that began in the mid-1990s affected firms incorporated in states like Massachusetts and California, known for their high-tech firms, more similarly than firms incorporated in other states. In untabulated results, we find that the specifications of Table Overall, the battery of tests reported in Tables 3 and 4 provide evidence on the internal validity of our quasi-experiments. Our findings on the effect of the MA legislation do not appear to be driven by measurement errors in tobin's q, time-invariant or firm-specific confounders, differential industry-level or state-level trends, or other time-varying omitted variables that could be captured by the lagged dependent variable.
External Validation Using IRRC
To further validate our main findings, we examine the hypothesis that staggered boards could be beneficial for early-life-cycle firms whose investors face greater information asymmetry by using an alternative sample of firms from the IRRC dataset. The advantage of the IRRC is that it offers a much broader sample of firms over time, providing an opportunity to validate our conclusions externally and to test more directly the possible heterogeneous effects of staggered boards. 21 The disadvantage of the IRRC is that, unlike our quasiexperimental MA setting, the variation captured in the data is unlikely to be driven by exogenous shocks. Thus we rely on the traditional pooled cross-sectional regression approaches in the governance literature (Gompers et al., 2010) and include a battery of firm-level controls that could explain both Q and the presence of staggered boards (Bebchuk et al., 2009 (Bebchuk et al., , 2013 : an index of other provisions in the G-Index (Gompers et al., 2003) , log of total assets, log of company age, an indicator for Delaware incorporation, percent of shares owned by insiders, square of insider ownership, return on assets, capital-expenditure-to-total-assets ratio, and R&D-to-sales ratio. Bebchuk et al. (2013) . 22 We regress 21 Each volume of the IRRC dataset covers 1,400 to 2,000 firms. In addition to those that belong to the S&P1500, firms considered important by the IRRC are also covered.
22 Our construction of the annual cross-sections of governance data follows Bebchuk et al. (2013) (See Section 2.1 of their paper.) We also follow them in using IRRC data up to 2007 and in excluding the newer RiskMetrics data because the latter data are not comparable.
Tobin's Q on an indicator for staggered boards (SB), and include firm controls, time-fixed effects, and industry-fixed effects.
23 On average, we find a negative and significant association between Tobin's Q and staggered boards in this sample of relatively large and mature firms.
Having replicated the traditional findings, we proceed to examine whether a subsample of firms in the IRRC dataset that are earlier in their life cycles and whose investors face a relatively high degree of information asymmetry exhibit the same cross-sectional associations.
We define as Early-Life-Cycle/High-Asymmetry those firms less than 6 years old (the median age of our MA-incorporated firms) whose market capitalization lies in the lowest quartile of the cross-sectional distribution, and whose information asymmetry (proxied by the Amihud illiquidity ratio) lies in the highest quartile of the cross-sectional distribution. Table 5 , column 2, estimates the specification of column 1, but includes an indicator for Early-Life-Cycle/High-Asymmetry and an interaction between SB and Early-LifeCycle/High-Asymmetry. We also include in our set of firm controls an additional interaction term between the index of other provisions in the G-Index and Early-Life-Cycle/HighAsymmetry. The main coefficient on SB in this regression suggests that, among the firms that are more mature or larger, or that exhibit a lower degree of information asymmetry, the association between Tobin's Q remains negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.
However, for the set of early-life-cycle firms that face a relatively high degree of information asymmetry, we find a significant positive association between SB and Tobin's Q. Indeed, among such firms the association is 0.2234 (0.3226-0.0992), which is statistically significant at the 10% level, as reported in the last row of the table. For comparability to our main results, Table 5 , column 3, repeats the estimation of column 2 but uses tobin's q as the dependent variable. These estimates suggest that SBs are associated with 10.69% higher Q among the Early-Life-Cycle/High-Asymmetry firms, whereas SBs are associated with 3.09% lower Q among larger and more mature firms.
To summarize, these results provide external validation of results and conclusions from the MA quasi-experiment. They further suggest that the impact of a staggered board may be different at different times in firms' life cycles.
Exploring Possible Mechanisms
This subsection investigates how a staggered board affects managers' behavior.
Effect on Innovating Firms
Supporters of staggered boards argue that takeover defenses can encourage innovation and investment, particularly at firms whose strategies require a long time horizon to execute and whose outside investors are likely to be less informed about the firm's value. At such firms, a staggered board might allow managers to invest in projects whose value becomes clear to outsiders only in the long run and whose eventual success may require tolerance for early failures (Manso, 2011) . We therefore examine the differential impact of the MA legislation on a subset of innovating firms, which we define as young firms and those that invest substantially in research and development. Table 6 , column 1, reports on an expanded version of the OLS specification in Table 2 , column 4-with time-and industry-fixed effects as well as firm controls-for the subsample of innovating treatment firms (firms that are younger than the median firm or that have an R&D-to-sales ratio in the top quintile of the 1990 CCM population) and their matched controls. We find that the baseline positive effects of staggered boards on Tobin's Q are concentrated in the innovating firms, which experienced a 17.7% increase in firm value following the MA legislation. In contrast, for the subsample of non-innovating firms (column 2), we find a DID coefficient that is close to zero in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable 26 from zero.
Column 3 further investigates the subsample of innovating firms that are covered by sellside analysts. The insulation that staggered boards provide may be more beneficial to firms that are subject to the pressures and earnings expectations of Wall Street analysts, which critics assert can lead to managerial myopia (e.g., Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis, 2009; Terry, 2015) . Our analysis suggests that the benefits of staggering are strongest at innovating firms that are covered by analysts; such firms experienced a 25.32% increase in Tobin's Q. In contrast, we find no significant effect on the subset of non-innovating or non-covered treatment firms (column 4).
Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that staggered boards are particularly valuable for innovating firms, and thus much more common among them.
Effect on Long-Run Investments
We next examine how firms' total investments in capital expenditures and in research and development (Investments) were affected by the MA legislation. Table 7 reports DID estimates using the entire sample (column 1), the subsample of innovating firms (column 2), and the subsample of innovating-and-covered firms (column 3). Note that we replace missing values in Capital Expenditure and R&D with zeros; in all regression specifications, indicators for missing values in capital expenditures and R&D are included.
We find that the MA legislation led to a significant increase in total investments in capital expenditures and R&D investments within the subset of innovating and innovatingand-covered firms that were most susceptible to the pressures of Wall Street. For the whole sample, we estimate an 8.7% increase in total investments; moreover, we find greater effects on total investments within the subsamples of firms that exhibit the largest effects in
Tobin's Q and that may find staggered boards most beneficial. In columns 2 and 3, our estimates suggest that the MA legislation led to a 10.8% increase in investments among 27 innovating firms, and a 15.6% increase in investments among innovating-and-covered firms.
Both estimates are economically significant and statistically significant at the 1% level.
In addition to examining ex-ante measures of innovation, we also analyze the effect of the legislation on patent generation, an ex-post measure of innovation. 24 Table 7 , columns 4-6 report DID estimates for Patents. For the entire sample of firms (column 4), we estimate a 10.1% increase in the number of patents (significant at the 1% level). Among the subsample of innovating firms (column 5) and innovating-and-covered firms (column 6), we estimate increases of 13% and 23.1% respectively. In both cases the estimated effects are significant at the 1% level.
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Overall, these results suggest that the value increase that a staggered board generates is explained, at least in part, by firms' greater willingness to invest in growth and innovation.
Firms that relied on innovation and faced analyst pressure experienced significant growth in total investments in capital and R&D expenditures as well as growth in patents. These findings are consistent with the claim that, at firms that face high information asymmetries, Wall Street scrutiny, and short-run earnings targets, staggered boards afford valuable stability and a longer-term investment horizon (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; He and Tian, 2013) .
Effect on Earnings Management
We supplement the preceding analyses by examining whether the imposition of a staggered board changed earnings-management behavior at the affected firms. To the extent 24 Our patent data are from the Thomson Innovation database, which provides international patent coverage. We collected information on all U.S. patent applications that our treatment firms and their matched control firms had submitted between January 1, 1984, and December 31, 1997, that were ultimately granted. The significant gap between 1997 and 2015 alleviates the "truncation problem" encountered by empirical studies that use patent data, namely the inclusion of fewer patent applications toward the end of the sample period due to the time lag between application and approval.
25 These results are robust to the use of citation-weighted patents (i.e., the number of patents weighted by the number of citations each patent received in subsequent years until 2015) as the dependent variable. that a staggered board alleviates short-term capital-market pressures, we might expect the affected MA firms to exhibit a less intense earnings management, which could also lead to value destruction (e.g., Stein, 1989) and thus lower Q.
We use measures of accounting-based earnings management drawn from the accounting literature. In particular, we employ versions of the "modified Jones" model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995) , computed from available quarterly data for the universe of firms in
Compustat. These earnings-management measures are computed by subtracting a modelimplied estimate of non-discretionary accruals from total accruals. Following Hribar and
Collins (2002), we compute total accruals as:
where IB is earnings before extraordinary items, CFO is cashflow from operating activities, XIDO is extraordinary items and discontinued operations, and ASSET S i,t−1 is lagged total assets.
We calculate two earnings-management measures based on two standard models of nondiscretionary accruals: Modified-Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) and Modified-Jones with ROA (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2005) . In each of these models, non-discretionary accruals are modeled as a linear function of changes in revenue (REV ) less changes in accounts receivables (REC ); gross property, plant, and equipment (PPE ); and, in the case of the Modified-Jones with ROA, lagged operating income before depreciation (OIBDP ):
where the coefficients of Eq., (2) are estimated by pooling observations for each three-digit SIC industry with more than 30 observations. Our earnings-management measures are obtained as the absolute value of the residuals from these estimation regressions. We refer to these as the absolute value of discretionary accruals (|DA|). Table 8 reports estimates from our DID specifications with firm-level controls, using the earnings-management measures as the main dependent variables of interest. Columns 13 examine |DA| from Modified-Jones. We find that, for the entire sample and for the subsamples of innovating and innovating-and-covered firms, there is significantly less earnings management at MA treated firms than at their matched control firms; the effect is larger at innovating and innovating-and-covered firms. Columns 46 examine |DA| from Modified-Jones with ROA, and obtain similar results from all three sample cuts.
These results complement those of Tables 6 and 7 . Jointly, our findings suggest that staggered boards can improve firm value by protecting certain managers from short-term capital-market pressures and by facilitating long-term investments in growth and innovation.
Effect on Return on Assets
Finally, we examine the effect of the MA legislation on return on assets. Table 9 , columns 1-3, report DID estimates on roa for the full sample, the subsample of innovating firms, and the subsample of innovating-and-covered firms. In each case we obtain a positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level) coefficient. The magnitude of the coefficient for the innovating firms (0.0205) is larger than that for the full sample (0.0161). For the subsample of innovating-and-covered firms, which exhibit the largest proportional increase in Q, increases in investments and innovation, and declines in earnings management, we also find the greatest increase in roa (0.0335), statistically significant at the 1% level. The results are similar when we do not use lagged roa as a control.
Our evidence thus differs from prior studies' findings that insulating governance mechanisms, such as staggered boards, are associated with worse operating performance (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2013) . In contrast to predictions that staggered boards could destroy value for shareholders by prompting managers to settle for the job security that such mechanisms afford them, our results suggest that staggered boards can be beneficial for early-life-cycle firms that face a relatively high degree of information asymmetry.
Conclusion
Staggered boards remain a topic of controversy in corporate governance, fueled in part by the conflicting results of academic research. Prior research suffers from a lack of causal identification and a failure to focus on how staggered boards change managers' behavior or on such boards' heterogeneous effects.
This study exploits a quasi-experimental setting created by a 1990 law requiring all Massachusetts-incorporated firms to adopt staggered boards. Our evidence suggests that staggered boards can be valuable at early-life-cycle firms whose managers contend with a relatively high degree of information asymmetry. At such firms, staggered boards encourage valuable investments and innovation and reduce earnings management. We find external validation for this hypothesis using the conventional IRRC data.
These findings contribute to the academic literature and to the corporate-governance debate by providing plausible causal identification that also sheds light on staggered boards' causal mechanisms and heterogeneous effects. We caution, however, that our findings do not suggest that staggered boards unambiguously improve firm value. Specifically, our work does not suggest that staggered boards benefit larger and more mature firms.
The idea that a staggered board may be valuable at a particular stage in a firm's life cycle is consistent with recent findings in the corporate-governance literature (e.g., Johnson et al., 2015) . Very young firms, and those facing severe information asymmetries, are typically funded by venture capital or other private investors (Chan, 1983) and are insulated 31 from the market for corporate control. Investors do not object to staggered boards at this early stage (Daines and Klausner, 2001) , and such firms typically go public with staggered boards. Some IPO firms even adopt more extreme protection from takeovers (e.g., dual-class shares), though these protections typically phase out as the firm matures and its founders leave the business. Generally speaking, not until public firms have matured do investors oppose staggered boards and prefer to rely instead on the market for corporate control. Our evidence suggests that, consistent with these patterns, staggered boards (and insulation from shareholder intervention) are useful to early-life-cycle firms that face more severe information asymmetries, and thus suggests that they might usefully be paired with sunset provisions that phase out these powerful insulating forces as firms mature. 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 -period (1984-1990) means of the characteristics of control firms (non-MA-incorporated firms without staggered boards in 1990), reported in column 1; treated firms (MA-incorporated firms without staggered boards in 1990), reported in column 2; their differences, reported in column 3; and the t-statistics associated with the differences in means, reported in column 4. t-statistics are computed based on cluster-robust standard errors. Column 5 reports the percentages of firms in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database in 1990 with values lower than the treated sample's pre-period mean.
(1) (2) (3) (4) Table 2 . Average Treatment Effect on tobin's q Column 1 reports OLS results of regressing tobin's q on a treatment indicator (Treat), a post-legislation indicator (Post), and an interaction of the two variables (Treat x Post). Columns 2-4 include firm-level controls, and vary depending on whether year or industry-fixed effects are included. The Post indicator is absorbed by time-fixed effects and is not reported in such specifications. All variables are defined in Table A1 . The sample period consists of the years 1984-1997. Standard errors are two-way-cluster robust, clustering at the state and year levels; they are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * , * * , and * * * for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
(1) Table 3 . Robustness
This table reports variants of the specification in Table 2 , column 4. Column 1 excludes the years 1989-1991; column 2 includes all the years from 1984 to 2004; column 3 uses total q of Peters and Taylor (2017) as the dependent variable; column 4 includes lag tobin's q as an additional control; column 5 includes firm-fixed effects; and column 6 includes industry-year-fixed effects. All variables are defined in Table A1 . The sample period consists of the years 1984-1997. Standard errors are two-way-cluster robust, clustering at the state and year levels; they are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * , * * , and * * * for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
(1) Table 4 . Pre-Treatment Trends and Contemporaneous Placebo Tests Columns 1 and 2 report OLS results from regressing tobin's q on a treatment indicator (Treat), an interaction with a post-legislation indicator (Treat x Post), time-and industry-fixed effects, and firm-level controls, as in Table 2 , column 4. An additional interaction term of Treat with a time indicator for the periods 1989-1990 and 1987-1990 is included in columns 1 and 2 to test for differential pre-treatment trends in tobin's q.
Columns 3 and 4 report the results of OLS regressions using tobin's q as dependent variables. The treatment firms are the MA-incorporated firms that already had staggered boards prior to the MA legislation; the control firms are comparable non-MA firms that already had staggered boards or had dual-class shares prior to the MA legislation. Firm-level controls are included in both columns, and time-and industry-fixed effects are included in column 4. All variables are defined in Table A1 . The sample period consists of the years 1984-1997. Standard errors are two-way-cluster robust, clustering at the state and year levels; they are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * , * * , and * * * for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 1 and 2 ) and tobin's q (column 3) on an indicator for staggered board (SB), an indicator for early-life-cycle/highinformation-asymmetry firms (Early-Life-Cycle/High-Asymmetry), and an interaction term (SB x Early-Life-Cycle/High-Asymmetry), firm controls, and time-and industry-fixed effects. EarlyLife-Cycle/High-Asymmetry firms are those less than 6 years old, whose market capitalization is in the bottom quartile, and whose Info Asymmetry is in the top quartile of the cross-sectional distribution. Following Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Bebchuk et al. (2013) , firm controls include an index of other provisions in the G-Index (Gompers et al., 2003) , log of total assets, log of company age, an indicator for Delaware incorporation, the percentage of shares owned by insiders, square of inside ownership, return on assets, capital-expenditure-to-total-assets ratio, and R&D-to-sales ratio. An additional interaction term between an index of other provisions in the G-Index and Early-Life-Cycle/High-Asymmetry is also included. The last row reports, for the specifications in columns 2 and 3, the p-value of the F-statistic that tests the null hypothesis that the staggered-board coefficient for Early-Life-Cycle/High-Asymmetry firms is 0. Standard errors are two-way-cluster robust, clustering at the state and year levels; they are and reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * , * * , * * * for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
(1) This table reports variants of the specification in Table 2 , column 4, based on subsamples. Column 1 (2) reports the result estimated using the subsample of innovating (non-innovating) treatment firms and their matched control firms; column 3 (4) reports the result estimated using the subsample of innovating-andcovered (non-innovating or non-covered) treatment firms and their matched control firms. Innovating firms are defined as those that are either young or R&D intensive. Young treatment firms are those firms whose age (in 1990 ) is below the median of the CRSP-Compustat Merged database universe; R&D intensive firms are those whose R&D-to-sales ratio (in 1990 ) is in the top quintile of the CRSP-Compustat Merged database universe. Covered treatment firms are those with analyst coverage in at least one of the four quarters prior to the legislation. All variables are defined in Table A1 . The sample period consists of the years 1984-1997. Standard errors are two-way-cluster robust, clustering at the state and year levels; they are and reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * , * * , * * * for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
(1) (2) (3) Table 7 .
Investments and Innovation
This table reports the results of OLS regressions using Investments (columns 1-3) and Patents (columns 4-6) as the dependent variables. Columns 1 and 4 report the results estimated using the full sample of firms and their matched control firms; columns 2 and 5 report the results estimated using the subsample of innovating treatment firms and their matched control firms; columns 3 and 6 report the results using the subsample of innovating-and-covered treatment firms and their matched control firms. Innovating firms are defined as those that are either young or R&D-intensive. Young treatment firms are those whose age (in 1990 ) is below the median of the CRSP-Compustat Merged database universe; R&D intensive firms are those whose R&D-to-sales ratio (in 1990 ) is in the top quintile of the CRSP-Compustat Merged database universe. Covered treatment firms are those with analyst coverage in at least one of the four quarters prior to the legislation. All variables are defined in Table A1 .The sample period consists of the years 1984-1997. Standard errors are two-way-cluster robust, clustering at the state and year levels; they are and reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * , * * , and * * * for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Investments Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Table 8 .
Earnings Management
This table reports the results of OLS regressions using the absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated using the Modified-Jones model (columns 1-3) or the Modified-Jones model augmented with ROA (columns 4-6), as the dependent variables. Columns 1 and 4 report the results estimated using the full sample of firms and their matched control firms; columns 2 and 5 report the results estimated using the subsample of innovating treatment firms and their matched control firms; columns 3 and 6 report the results using the subsample of innovating-and-covered treatment firms and their matched control firms. Innovating firms are defined as those that are either young or R&D intensive. Young treatment firms are those whose age (in 1990 ) is below the median of the CRSP-Compustat Merged database universe; R&D-intensive firms are those whose R&D-to-sales ratio (in 1990 ) is in the top quintile of the CRSP-Compustat Merged database universe. Covered treatment firms are those with analyst coverage in at least one of the four quarters prior to the legislation. All variables are defined in Table A1 . The sample period consists of the years 1984-1997. Standard errors are two-way-cluster robust, clustering at the state and year levels; they are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * , * * , and * * * for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
|DA| using Modified Jones |DA| Modified-Jones with ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Table 9 .
Return on Assets
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of roa on Treat, an interaction of Treat and Post, firmand industry-fixed effects, and firm-level controls. Column 1 reports the results estimated using the full sample of firms and their matched control firms; column 2 reports the results estimated using the subsample of innovating treatment firms and their matched control firms; column 3 reports the results using the subsample of innovating-and-covered treatment firms and their matched control firms. Innovating firms are defined as those that are either young or R&D-intensive. Young treatment firms are those whose age (in 1990 ) is below the median of the CRSP-Compustat Merged database universe; R&D-intensive firms are those whose R&D-to-sales ratio (in 1990 ) is in the top quintile of the CRSP-Compustat Merged database universe. Covered treatment firms are those with analyst coverage in at least one of the four quarters prior to the legislation. All variables are defined in Table A1 . The sample period consists of the years 1984-1997. Standard errors are two-way-cluster robust, clustering at the state and year levels; they are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * , * * , and * * * for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
(1) (2) 
